Recent Developments in Dominion-Provincial Fiscal Relations in Canada by James A. Maxwell
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Recent Developments in Dominion-Provincial Fiscal Relations
in Canada





Chapter Title: Analysis of the Federal Proposals
Chapter Author: James A. Maxwell
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5634
Chapter pages in book: (p. 30 - 51)ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL PROPOSALS
Until a few years ago adjustment of Dominion-provincial rela-
tions was not tied to the pursuit of "a high level of employment
and income".48 Rather was the adjustment regarded as a revi-
sion, long overdue, that would bring the Canadian governmental
system up to date with respect to the performance of the normal
functions of government. In particular it was appreciated that
the constitution had assigned to the provinces more duties than
they could finance from the sources of revenue at their disposal.
Federal intervention, whether by enlargement of functions or
by granting financial assistance to the provinces, or by both,
seemed to be indicated, and a debate went on concerning the
particular steps to be taken. The Royal Commission on Domin-
ion-Provincial Relations provided the most definite answers and,
had the war not intervened, its recommendations might have
been implemented. Even with the war some of its recommenda-
tions were adopted, notably passage of the unemployment in-
surance and the family allowances acts. As a wartime measure,
moreover, the federal government took over complete jurisdic-
tion with respect to income taxation—a step recommended by
the Commission for peacetime. The Commission also perceived
—albeit dimly—some features of a program to maintain a high
level of employment and income.
The war was, of course, responsible for lifting countercyclical
policy from the classroom to the forum. Government became
omnipresent. No phase of economic life escaped its influence.
Techniques for the utilization of all resources, for shifting re-
sources from this to that activity, were tried out and judged
successful. National production doubled, and although one-half
was devoted to war, "the general level of civilian consumption
was not reduced; for the lower income groups it was significantly
increased".49 This achievement lightened the burden of the
war beyond what had been thought possiblein1939. The
chief responsibility for organizing the Canadian war effort had
fallen upon the federal government, and what was accomplished
seemed to it to demonstrate the potentialities of the Canadian
Dominion-ProvincialConference, 1945, Submissions and Discussions, p.6.
Conference, Proposals of the Government of Canada, p.1.
30economy under a full head of steam. It concluded that it would
be absurd to revert to the conditions prevailing in 1939 when
adequate opportunities for employment and enterprise were
not created, when provision for social security was inadequate,
and when the structure of government finance was defective.
Its proposals to the Dominion-Provincial Conference in 1945
evidenced the firm belief not only that much had been done
during the war, but also that much had been learned about
fiscal techniques and fiscal policy. And this knowledge it meant
to apply.
The situation in 1945 encouraged the opinion that bold federal
action should be attempted in order to achieve an orderly transi-
tion from war to peace. At the war peak "not far from half of
the Canadian people derived their occupation and their incomes
directly, or indirectly, from governmental expenditures".5° The
decision was taken that a conscious effort be made to hold
national income at a high level, and to retain in productive
employment at least 900,000 of the 1,323,000 persons added
to the labor force since 1939.51 Exports, subject to fantastic
expansion during the war, were to be held 60 percent in dollar
value and 15 percent in volume above the prewar level.
In its proposals to the Dominion-Provincial Conference the
federal government attempted therefore to meet a twofold
objective: adjustment of federal-provincial financial relations and
formulation of a coordinated fiscal effort to maintain full employ-
ment. At the Conference, discussion was confined almost entirely
to the first. The provincial governments manifested little interest
in full employment and tended to appraise the federal proposals
in terms of their effect upon provincial budgets. In itself this indi-
cated both the difficulties arising from the division of govern-
mental responsibilities in Canada and the certainty that effective
action would be impaired unless a cooperative program was
devised by which all levels of government would work toward
50Employment and Income with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Recon-
struction(King's Printer, Ottawa, 1945). p.1. The figure includes persons in
military service.
51Asof June 1, 1944, the number of persons in remunerative occupations, "including
service in the armed forces, but excluding women in agriculture," was 5,016,000,
compared with 3,693,000 in 1939. Ibid., p. 2.
31acommon end. The federal government thereforeboldly
avowed its intention of maintaining a high level of income and
employment by influencing exports, private investment, public
investment, and consumption. It proposed to "budget for a cycle
rather than any one fiscal year". In periods of declining business
activity, governmental expenditures, especially federal, should be
expanded and tax rates reduced; deficits should be accepted and
planned "in order to give the economy a stimulus and relieve
unemployment. As a corollary the government will also plan
for substantial budgets and debt retirement in periods of high
business activity...Themodern governmental budget must
be the balance wheel of the economy; its very size today is such
that if it were allowed to fluctuate up and down with the rest
of the economy instead of deliberately counter to the business
swings it would so exaggerate booms and depressions as to be
disastrous. "52
Theimplication is that the budget will be balanced over the
cycle, although no more explicit statement is made than a declara-
tion in the so-called White Paper, Employment and Income, of
an intention to maintain "a proper balance in the budget over
a period longer than a single year". The federal budgets of 1946
and 1947 reflected the conflicting forces affecting policy. Imme-
diate tax reductions could not, in the words of the Minister
of Finance, be justified by "economic considerations alone"; on
the contrary, a case for temporarily higher taxes could be made
"in order to curb the excess of spending in some directions that
is tending to pull prices up".53 Tax reduction was indicated, how-
ever, by the desirability of releasing business initiative and stimu-
lating production. On balance the government decided in favor
of tax reduction and some persons may deduce that fiscal policy
will be used only for anti-deflationary purposes.
Tactically the events of the war had both strengthened and
weakened theability of the Dominion to bargain with the
provinces. Wartime federal occupancy of the field of income
taxation had accustomed taxpayers to one rate and one return,
52Dominion-ProvincialConference, 1945, Submissions and Discussions, p. 60; see
also p. 113.
53House of Commons Debales, Daily Edition, July 27, 1946, p. 2990; ibid., April
29, 1947, p. 2620.
32and the onus of change would fall upon the provincial govern-
ments. If the Dominion maintained high rates—and such a step
was indicated because of its heavy postwar responsibilities—the
pr®vincial governments would have to reimpose their taxes on top
of the high federal rates.In 1941 the federal government,
seeking to set rates at the level most effective for purposes of
war finance, had to take account of the existing system of
provincial taxes; in 1947 a provincial government, seeking to
reenter, the fields of personal income and corporation taxes,
would be forced to take cognizance of both the federal rates and
the rates to be imposed by the other provinces. The federal
government had, to be sure, promised by the tax agreements to
reduce its rates by an amount that would enable the provinces
to reenter the fields they had vacated. But this undertaking still
left the federal government with the whip hand. It had high
rates in effect and could make a strong case for maintaining
them. The provincial governments would have to squeeze in as
best they could. On the other hand, the federal government had
committed itself to a program of full employment. Blame for
failure to achieve this program would fall upon it, even though
implementation was hindered by provincial noncooperation. For
this reason the federal government was prepared to pay a high
price in order to acquire the powers deemed adequate to make
its program successful.
Table S is instructive on several accounts. The 1940 recom-
mendations of the Royal Commission were, of course, made
before the wartime transformation of the scope of governmental
finance and when gross national product was much lower than
in 1945-1947. Yet the totals under the three main headings arC
comparable in that each represents what the federal
government was prepared to pay at different times for control
of income taxation, succession duties, and statutory subsidies.
The most obvious fact is the growing price it paid or offered in
order to obtain complete jurisdiction over income and death
taxation. If the wartime situation is made the base, the final
offer in 1947 was 84 percent higher; if the recommendations of
the Royal Commission are made the base, 230 percent.
Another striking fact is the large percentage increase in the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Part of the explanation is the haphazard condition of subsidies
before World War II. The poorer and smaller provinces, driven
by fiscal need, had importuned the Dominion through the decades
for "better terms", and this pressure had produced results by
way ofspecialincreasesinsubsidies. Any across-the-board
revision was therefore bound to effect a relative improvement
in the shares of the richer provinces—Ontario, Quebec, and
British Columbia—to correct for anomalies of earlier origin.
Part of the explanation is related to the transfer of income and
death taxation. In Ontario (and to a lesser extent, in Quebec
and British Columbia) the provincial right to tax income was
important. From them net transfers would take place as a result
of federal collection of income taxes and distribution of the
revenue by way of subsidies or expenditures on social services.
The richer provinces were, for these reasons, in a strong position
to bargain for an improvement in their subsidy position.
The figures indicate also the impact of provincial bargaining
at the different periods. The proposals of the Royal Commission
were unacceptable to Ontario ;54 it balked at the idea of giving
up income taxation and of receiving no national adjustment
grant. The federal proposal in 1941 that subsidies depend upon
prior collections of the personal income and corporation taxes
was much more to its liking (as well as to that of British Colum-
bia). The poorer provinces, however, could not be expected to
acquiesce in this basis after the war. Accordingly, the federal
government at the Dominion-Provincial Conference in August
1945 proposed a basis different from that of both the tax
agreements and the Royal Commission. This new basis not only
raised the total subsidies but also improved the relative position
of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Saskatchewan,
and Alberta. Moreover, the federal proposals for the expansion
of social service expenditure had special attractions for the
poorer provinces. Any federal expenditure that brings about a
uniform level of provision for social services across the nation
means a net transfer of current resources from the richer to the
poorer provinces as long asthe federal tax collections are not
regressive.
Theywere unacceptable also to British Columbia and Alberta for special reasons.
Quebec was noncommital.
35
'IThe changes during the subsequent negotiations served chiefly
to raise total subsidies. Retention of the old statutory subsidies
was a minor provincial victory for the smaller provinces—a
victory that will be regarded by most impartial observers as
unfortunate, wholly apart from the amounts involved. In the
words of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Rela-
tions, these subsidies have a "long and tortuous" history: based
"on no clear principles", they have been altered not infre-
quently for "specious reasons". The Royal Commission recom-
mended their abolition because it thought this would be "in itself
no inconsiderable reform".55 Certainly the new system of sub-
sidies does not rest upon any clear principle. It is a compromise
that gives weight to fiscal need, to equality of per capita grants,
to historical developments, and to bargaining ability.
SOCIAL SECURITY (coNsuMPTIoN) PROGRAM
Expansion of the social security program—national health, old
age pensions, unemployment assistance—receded into the back-
ground after the Dominion-Provincial Conference failed to reach
an agreement. The proposals had, in fact, been put forward as
bait to gain provincial adherence to the whole plan. Under
present arrangements social security legislationis primarily a
provincial responsibility and the heaviest pressure for its expan-
sion is upon the provincial governments. By lifting part of the
financial burden from provincial shoulders and by aiding im-
plementation of new measures, the federal government could
hope to gain support, especially from the western provinces. Of
course, it had also a direct interest in expanding social security
as a means of alleviating human suffering and of improving
living standards.
Finally, the federal government looked at its social security
proposals in terms of their effect upon consumption. A premise
of the theory of compensatory spending is that the level of
consumption depends mainly on the level and the distribution
of incomes. An enlarged and improved program ofsocial
security would be important in maintaining stability of expendi-
tures on consumption. Governmental expenditures on social
security in 1945 were about $200 million. The federal program
Book II, p.270.
36might have added $440 million, not including the cost of unem-
ployment assistance. Part of the program would be directly
countercyclical. An increase in unemployment, with a consequent
shrinkage in wage payments, would swell governmental expendi-
tures for unemployment benefits and assistance which would
offset, in part at least, a decline in private payments. In depres-
sion, moreover, the number of persons 65-69 years old who
could meet a means test might be expected to mount and this
would lead to an increase in governmental expenditures for pen-
sions to them. On the other hand, the pensions proposed for
persons 70 or more years old were to be automatic, and to
depend simply upon reaching a given age. They would not,
therefore, be countercyclical, nor would the expenditures for
national health.
INVESTMENT
The federal program for encouraging private investment did not
call for a large measure of provincial collaboration (other than
acceptance of the tax proposals). The foreign aspects were
clearly a matter of federal responsibility and the federal govern-
ment had been zealous in pressing for reduction and removal
of trade barriers by international agreement, and in participating
in international institutions designed to assist investment and
stability in price levels. All such steps were, of course, compatible
with and essential to the program for full employment. In the
domestic field private investment was to be encouraged by tax
reform, of which centralization of income taxation and succes-
sion duties was one aspect. Like the Royal Commission, the
federal government put great stress upon the elimination or
reduction of taxes that made for a high level of production costs,
and upon the removal of tax penalties on enterprise. At one stage
of the negotiations it declared that ifits proposals were ac-
cepted, an attempt would be made to reduce "the element of
double taxation of corporate income with its tendency to dis-
courage risk-taking enterprise".56
The public investment program called for a clear line between
the activities for which the federal governrrient would assume full
responsibility and thosefor which the provinces would be
66Dominion-ProvincialConference, 1945, Submissions and Discussions, p.388.
37responsible. With respect to the latter, the federal government
was, however, prepared to give financial assistance in order to
obtain the control of timing. The federal government stated its
belief that public investment could not in itself solve the problem
of postwar employment and that public investment "must not
be of a nature competing with and replacing private investment,
or it will simply defeat its own ends". The "guiding criterion"
should be so to direct public investment as "to compensate for
fluctuations in private investment and employment".57
One major issue in timing concerns the postponability of public
investment. Some part is not postponable; it must be made when
the need is manifest, regardless of cyclical conditions. The federal
government was, however, prepared not merely to insist that
many public projects were postponable, but also that machinery
should be established to screen all public projects so as to fit
as many as possible into the postponable category. And since
provincial and municipal investment had, before the war, greatly
exceeded federal, it was "highly desirable" that these govern.
ments be persuaded "to accept similar timing policies to those
that the Dominion proposes for its own programme".58
The federal government offered both planning and timing
grants to the provincial governments. The former would cover
one-half the cost of planning provided it accepted the projects
as subject to timing. The amount of the planning cost eligible
for a federal grant was not, however, to exceed 7V2percentof
the project Cost, and the annual grant to a province was not to
exceed $1 per capita. Provincial (and municipal) projects, when
they had been accepted by the federal government and registered
as fully planned, became eligible for timing grants. The amount
and terms of these grants were "to be announced in January of
any year in which, in the light of the general employment and
economic situation, the Dominion considers such assistance to be
desirable"
Ibid.,pp. 7 6-7.
58 Ibid., p. 82. Provincial and municipal expenditures on new investment, replace-
ments, and major improvements were $109,000,000 in 1929, $61,800,000 in 1933, and
$148,900,000 in 1937, while Dominion expenditure was$58,500,000,$26,300,000, and
$34,600,000. In 1941, however, Dominion expenditure was $415,900,000; provincial
and municipal, $84,700,000.
Ibid., p. 386.
38During the Conference no serious discussion of public invest-
ment was recorded. It is, however, vitally important for com-
pensatory spending that effective machinery be set up to screen
all public projects in terms of postponability and that actual
postponement of projects be made financially attractive to pro-
vincial and municipal governments. The difficulties are preemi-
nently of a practical nature. Even with respect to projects that
are strictly federal, postponement will call for restraint never
exercised in the past. The percentage public investment was of
total investment in durable physical assets rose from 19.8in
1926 to 24.8 in 1929, i.e., in the boom years, when both were
rising. This obviously, was not countercyclicaL In the next four
years, 1930-33, the public investment percentage rose to 33.2 at
a time when both totals were falling. The percentage increase in
public investment was,therefore,not countercyclical. What
happened was merely that public investment fell off less sharply
than private. In absolute figures the low point of public invest-
ment in durable physical assets coincided in 1933 with the low
point of private investment. Federal officers directly interested in
federal projects have always felt that their primary duty is to
push toward initiation and completion as rapidly as possible.
Political pressure operates in exactly the same direction. Against
direct pressures of this type the only defenseis the general
interest of the Dominion in a countercyclical policy. Unless some
body is set up with the power and the desire to implement such
apolicy,failureiscertain. With respect to provincial and
municipal projects all the difficulties are aggravated. By their
very nature these projects are likely to be in answer to needs
that are both current and localized. Resistance to postponement
will, therefore, be keen. In prosperous periods the provincial
(and municipal) governments will, moreover, have abundant
revenues and an optimistic outlook. The temptation to disregard
the recommendation of a federal investment board to postpone
projects will be strong. To overcome this temptation it would
seem that the federal government would have to be extremely
generous inits contributions in and extremely nig-
gardly in prosperous periods.
Any subsidy policy might prove inadequate and the effective
pursuit of countercyclical policy with respect to public investment
39might require centralized control of public borrowing through a
Dominion-provincial loan council. Such a body would need to
have the power to determine the annual total of governmental
borrowing and toallocateit among the governments. The
Australian Loan Council might be a model. The Council passes
upon total governmental borrowing forall purposes except
defense, and allocatesit among the seven governments—the
Commonwealth and six states. Since the war the Commonwealth
government has set up ,a Ministry of Works, and the states,
together with the Commonwealth government, have set up a
National Works Council. This Council will advise the Loan
Council concerning a public works program.
A scheme of countercyclical spending for public works would
have at least two elements of strength in Canada it would lack
in the United States. In Canada the federal budget—and the
budgets of the provincial governments—are under executive
control. The proposals outlined by the Minister of Finance in
his budget speech are carried through the Parliament with little
or no change. In the United States, however, the budget as
offered by the President is always subject to changes, which, in
periods of prosperity, are almost certain to be increases. Particu-
larlyis this the case with respect to public works. Sectional
groups indulge in log-rolling; projects are added which, consid-
ered individually and on their merits, would not be sanctioned.6°
In Canada, moreover, it appears that the present scope of public
60Nowherein the documents prepared for the Conference or in the Subinission.s
and Discussions is there any proposal for variation of expenditure other than public
investment. The reasons are not obscure. Most ordinary expenditure for the dayby
day functions of government must flow at a fairly uniform rate; most of it is not
postponable. And once appropriations have been provided, no handy machinery is
available for over-all retardation or acceleration of their use. Certainly the device
of Congressional rescissionis unworkable for countercyclical purposes. Recently,
however, President Truman took the unusual step of writing letters to all federal
departments directing them to reduce their expenditures for the fiscal year 1947,
and making specific requests to the War Department, the Navy Department, and
the Maritme Commission (New York Aug. 2, 1946). The effectiveness of
this device may be doubted although appropriations for 1947 were extremely gener-
ous and most departments have fat °that could be eliminated. But certainly the
possibility of action to vary ordinary expenditures in Canada should have been
explored because the issue of legislative-executive control of the budget is much less
acute. The reason for the failure to explore this area is probably preoccupation with
devices to check deflation rather than inflation itself.
40investment is relatively larger than in the United States, and
this means that, without further institutional change, the leverage
of governmental action would be greater.6'
TAX CHANGES
The proposal that the federal government assume the personal
income and corporation taxes and succession duties—together
with the quid pro quo in terms of subsidy—raised the issues most
debated at the Conference. The arguments in favor advanced
by the Dominion government, with the support of several pro-
vincial governments, stressed the long-run economic advantages
of federal control—and per contra the disadvantages of pro-
vincial control—as well as the importance of the step in terms
of a compensatory spending policy.62 The arguments against
stressed the historical-constitutional position and the impairment
of provincial autonomy.
Exclusive federal control of the income tax (and succession
duties) was looked upon as vital in terms of countercyclical
policy. The amount of these taxes, personal and corporate, has
a direct bearing upon the volume of spending and "upon the
incentive to produce and to undertake capital expansion. It is
therefore important that these taxes should be levied exclusively
by the Dominion Government. It is the only government which,
because it can budget for the whole business cycle, is able to set
rates in such a way as to contribute to a high and stable level
of employment."63 The income tax (and succession duties) were,
Thisstatement cannot readily be verified. In Canada, however, new public con-
struction for 1937-41 was 4-6percentof total new construction, whereas in the
United States it was 41 percent. See Conference, Public Investment and Capital
Formation, p. 93; Simon Kuznets, National Product since 1869 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1946), p. 40.
t32Anargument not of weight in the deliberation was tha.t exclusive federal juris-
diction over the income tax (and succession duties) would facilitate negotiation of
double taxation conventions with foreign countries and thereby protect Canadian
interests abroad from discriminatory treatment. The fact that the provincial govern-
ments shared these tax fields would, of course, not deter the federal government from
making conventions with respecttoits own taxes. But some foreign countries,
unaccustomed to the federal form of government, have misunderstood the dual
jurisdiction of Canada and have been dissatisfied with a convention that covered
only federal taxes. The provincial governments could, indeed, negotiate individually
with foreign governments concerning double taxation. But only a few of the
provinces were interested.
63 Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1945, Submissions and Discussion.s, p. 114.
41in short, fiscal weapons of great power. If used successfully, the
total real burden of taxation over the entire business cycle would
be reduced. The confidence of the Dominion government is
evident in the promises it made in the event its proposals were
accepted. The income tax, personal and corporate, would be
lowered, double corporate taxation removed, federal responsi-
bilities for employables extended. No fears were expressed that
the postwar problem of federal debt would be unmanageable.
The gross debt was, indeed, more than three times greater than
in 1939. But the burden of carrying it was not much greater
because of lower interest rates and larger national income, both
attributable, in part at least, to successful federal management
during the war.
This positive argument in favor of exclusive federal use of
income taxation and succession duties was bolstered by a negative
argument against provincial use. With the best will in the world
the nine provincial governments could not—so the argument
ran—coordinate their decisions or adjust their rates flexibly in
response to changing economic conditions; by independent action
they might impair or defeat federal policy. If, for example, the
federal government in depression decided to raise exemptions,
and if,at the same time, the provincial governments lowered
exemptions, the fiscaleffect might be neutral. The provincial
governments were certain to be influenced by short-run financial
considerations. Because of a limited abilityto borrow, and
therefore to incur deficits, they would in the future as in the
past be tempted toraise ratesindepression. The inherent
cyclical variability of the yield from income taxation (and succes-
sion duties), because of the inherent variability of the base,
increased this temptation. Variability, which strengthened the
case for federal control, had always hampered development of
income taxation as a major source of provincial revenue. The
provincial governments needed stable sources of revenue, and
the unconditional grants now offered them were, for this reason,
a desirable substitute, On the other hand, federal spokesmen at
the Conference were confident that the federal government, with
unquestioned credit and with control over monetary policy, could
regard deficits in depression as an instrument of countercyclical
policy, not as a threat to its solvency.
42The negative argument was elaborated further by picturing as
a certainty that many provincial governments, if forced by ex-
piration of the wartime tax agreements to reenter the field of
income taxation, would resort to discriminatory practices. The
validity of thisfederal argument was reinforced by explicit
avowals of intention by certain provincial governments.64 In such
case a scramble for revenue would ensue which might impair
incentives and business confidence, and reestablish a regressive
tax system. The people of the poorer province expected, and
would demand, provision of social services at a level not much
below that in the richer provinces. The time had passed when a
provincial government would fail to provide social services for
its people because its tax resources were inferior. Rather was it
certain that the services would be provided and that revenue
would be found, even if arbitrary and makeshift devices had to
be adopted. That such aprocedure would jeopardize a national
program of full employment indicated that the federal govern-
ment should do something to meet the need of the poor provinces.
It was to the interest of the Dominion as a whole that an
adequate level of social services be maintained in every province.
The federal government argued that such a policy was wise on
grounds of broad statesmanship and equity;it was wise also
because, as part of a countercyclical program, steps to maintain
greater stability in the flow of expenditure on consumption would
be taken.
Quite apart from considerations of countercyclical policy, the
Royal Commission had earlier advanced strong economic argu-
ments in favor of the centralization of income and death taxes.
The income tax is the most powerful, sensitive, and flexible of
all taxes. Prewar experience had shown that through it pro-
vincial governments could project themselves outside their boun-
daries, thereby inflicting injury upon the nation as a whole that
was in no sense offset by the financial gains accruing to them.
This phenomenon is familiar in the United States. R. M. Haig
PremierGarson of Manitoba declared if the negotiations failed, "it is we
[Manitoba and the poorer provinces] who, in our efforts to get revenue will be
forced against our will into adopting expedients which will not be in the public
interest, but which we shall have to adopt as the least of the evils with which we
shall be confronted." Ibid., p. 607.
43once likened the federal government and the states to fishermen
fishing in the same trout stream.65 The state fishermen arc for-
bidden to obstruct the passage of fish from one pooi to another,
but the prohibition is defective. Some fishermen use illegal tackle,
even dynamite. Some pools are poor and their yield is inferior
for this reason and because inadequate tackle is used; some pools
are rich and in them the big trout, who are wise and wary,
choose to reside. The analogy suggests the economic defects of
discriminatory taxation of income. Unnecessarily heavy costs of
compliance and of administration are additional defects.
The argument advanced at the Conference by certain provin-
cial governments, particularly Ontario, against federal assump-
tion of the income tax (and succession duties)in return for
subsidies rests upon grounds difficult to appraise. Broadly, it is
that this step would impair provincial autonomy and thereby
threaten the very foundations of confederation.
The constitutional-historical basis of this argument is uncon-
vincing. Though by Section 92 of the British North America Act,
the provinces are confined to "direct taxation within the prov-
ince", they do not necessarily have a priority in direct taxation.
By Section 91 the federal government is unequivocally given the
right to raise money "by any mode or system of taxation", and
although almost no use of direct taxation was made until World
War I, the reason was lack of need rather than lack of power.
If the intentions of the fathers of confederation are explored,
little comfort can be found by those who oppose centralization,
because most of the fathers were centralizers. Some of their
followers—and many of their constituents—were of an opposite
bent, but the real curbs on federal power in Canada came only
through practical experience with federalism. The most explicit
thought concerning the provinces and direct taxation expressed
by the fathers was that limitation of the provinces to this source
would put a fortunate curb upon possible provincial extravagance.
The political prop of the argument against centralization is
more appealing. It is not absurd to say that cession of important
fields of taxation in return for subsidies would make the pro-
65TheCoordination of the Federal-State Tax Systems, Proceedings of the National
Tax Association, 1932, p. 220.
44vincial governments "annuitants of Ottawa"66 and that exercise
of therighttotaxisan important feature of provincial
autonomy.
A comparison of Dominion and provincial dependence upon
direct taxes is relevant to the merits of this debate. In 1939 the
provincial governments collected only one-fifthas much by
income taxation (personal and corporation) as the federal gov-
ernment; only 13 percent of total provincial tax revenue came
from this source, compared with 26 percent of federal. These
figures seem to suggest that the provincial governments exag-
gerated the significance of the cession of this source of revenue.
Provincial failure to develop income taxation might seem to
indicate also its relative unsuitability to their needs. Other types
of taxation—retail sales, gasoline, excises—would be left with
the provinces, and so also would revenue from the public domain
and from liquor control. And if the issue were the amount of
revenue, the subsidies offered by the federal government prom-
ised to be more adequate than income taxation. For Manitoba
the guaranteed minimum grant—-even before the federal govern-
ment increased its offer in 1947—was 62 percent more than
had ever been collected from the personal income tax, corpora-
tion taxes, and succession duties.
The argument that provincial autonomy would be impaired
was denounced vigorously by several provincial governments
themselves. Premier Garson of Manitoba, for example, insisted
that a province unable to make effective use of the income tax,
yet with heavy responsibilities for expenditure, possessed an
illusory autonomy. The essence of autonomy was freedom of
action and this the federal subsidies would make possible. These
subsidies were outright payments without strings, automatically
determined on an objective basis. Receipt of them would, he
argued, permit the poorer provinces to fulfill their constitutional
obligations: "An increase in the Dominion subsidy would not be
an invasion of provincial autonomy, but the very reverse. For
a majority of the provinces it would merely make their present
illusory autonomy consisting of the legal right to do things, a
06Dominion-ProvincialConference, 1945, Submissions and Discussions, p.419.
45reality by clothing them with the financial capacity to exercise
that right."67
The fact that the subsidies proposed by the federal govern-
ment are unconditional raises an important problem not consid-
ered at the Conference. How can large unconditional subsidies be
reconciled with the so-called principle of financial responsibility,
which implies that a government should raise and spend its own
revenues? Unconditional subsidies infringe upon this principle
because the spending government owes no responsibility to the
government from which the subsidies have.come, and its responsi-
bility to its electors is tenuous because it has not raised the money
from them by revenue measures of its own.
The conflict between unconditional subsidies and financial re-
sponsibility was resolved in favor of the former. Mr. lIsley was
critical even of the proposition advanced earlier by the Royal
Commission that subsidies should rest upon fiscal need. Such
subsidies were "undesirable from the standpoint of provincial in-
dependence" because the provincial levels of expenditure and tax-
ation would be reviewed by some extra-provincial body. In short,
the subsidies proposed by the federal government in 1945-46
were to be unconditional subsidies in their strictest form. The
corollary was that the federal government did not intend to
enforce provision of national minimum standards ofsocial
services. The desirability of such provision by the provincial
governments was freely admitted, but no part of the federal
proposals was designed to ensure it. A provincial government
in receipt of the new subsidies might, so Mr. Ilsley insisted, "do
exactl.y °asitlikes about itslevel of social services".68 Mr.
Abbott, who succeeded Mr. Ilsley as Minister of Finance, was
also critical of fiscal need as the sole basis for subsidies. Its
adoption would, in his opinion, mean either that the federal
government must hand over federal money to the provincial
governments "no matter how reckless their expenditure policy
might be", or that it supervise provincial "budgetary policies".
The former would be offensive to Canadian taxpayers; the latter
the federal governments would "resist to the utmost".69
67ibid.,pp. 160-i.
68 Ibid.. p. 510.
House of Commons Debates, Daily Edition, July 9, 1947,p.5422.
46The position of the federal government is due to a compli-
cated conflict of values, political and economic, which cannot be
appraised here. Few observers—either in or out of political life
—consider Canadian experience with unconditional subsidies
propitious. In 1867 the subsidies rested upon constitutional ces-
sion by the provinces of the right to levy customs duties; in 1947
the subsidies rested upon a contractual cession by the provinces
of the right to levy income taxation and succession duties. In
1867 the subsidies were meant to be fairly rigid in amount;
in 1947 the subsidies were to be increased according to an objec-
tive measure of the growth of the country. Experience will show
whether these differences will make for better results. Under
the new terms the provincial governments will receive very large
additions to the revenue at their disposal. They will be in a
position to discharge those responsibilities in which a national as
well as provincial interest exists. The federal government does
not, however, intend to scrutinize what is done because that
might impair provincial autonomy.70
One other minor criticism of the proposed subsidies is that they
are to vary with gross national product and population. So far
as the latter are variable, the receipts of the provincial govern-
ments will vary cyclically, which would not be in harmony with
the policy of compensatory spending. The formula, however, by
which subsidies are to be determined reduces this variability in
three ways: a high floor is set below which subsidies are not to
fall regardless of gross national product, population is given
equal weight with gross national product, and population is a
relatively stable component; the subsidies are to rest upon the
average of components for three years.
SEPARATION OF SOURCES OF REVENUE
The proposals advanced by the federal government were the
nub of the debate over revision of federal-provincial financial
relations. Ontario, however, did make alternative proposals, one
70Inthe United States the familiar quid pro quo attached to federal subsidies is
the imposition of conditions concerning particular functions. Other possibilities of a
more general nature might be the requirement that receipt of subsidies would be
conditional upon reform of provincial-local tax systems, or of removal of barriers
to interprovincial trade. Such conditions would presumably also be regarded as
impairing provincial autonomy.
47feature of which deserves attention.71 Any agreement was to he
"transitional". Before its expiration steps should be taken to
protect provincial autonomy by separating tax sources and assign-
ing some to the federal government and some to the provinces.
After the Conference broke up, other provinces continued to
press, in the words of Premier Angus L. Macdonald of Nova
Scotia, for "the permanent allocation of exclusive and adequate
sources of revenue to each governmental authority".72 The
Dominion yielded so far as to announce the withdrawal, effective
April 1, 1947, of its 3 cents per gallon tax on gasoline sales. ft
did not, however, concede the feasibility of an irrevocable separa-
tion of sources.
In Canada, as in every federation, the idea of a clean-cut
division of revenues has always had its advocates. Starting from
the premise that sovereignty is divided and does not inhere in
the national government alone, they conclude that provincial
(state) governments should be assigned definite and specific
sources of revenue. The federal request in 1945 for sole jurisdic-
tion over income taxation naturally suggested a provincial request
for sole jurisdiction over other tax fields; and an argument for
avoidance of double taxation of income seemed applicable to
other taxes.
If the federal government is assigned complete jurisdiction
over income taxation in order to avoid double taxation,isit
necessarily desirable to remove double taxation of gasoline,
amusements, etc.? Do the arguments favoring separation of
sources with respect to the income tax apply in the same sense
with respect to other taxes? One point to notice concerns the
meaning of double taxation. It can mean merely the imposition
of a similar tax by several taxing authorities. But unless the
baseis defined differently, and unless different administrative
rules are framed and applied, this need not involve conflict and
will not create high compliance and collection costs. Levy of a
tax on gasoline by both the federal government and the provinces
has, for these reasons, not been discriminatory. Multiple levy of
71 The Ontario proposals as a whole need not be examined. They contained a
subsidy formula which, while different from that of the federal government, did
not raise any question of principle. For a descriptionit see Dominion-Provincial
Conference, 1945, Submissions and Discussions, pp. 399, 571, and 533.
Conference, Correspondence Since the Budget of 1946, p. 32.
48income taxes (and death duties) has, however, been discrimina-
tory in the past. In negotiating for control the federal govern-
ment feared that taxation of income on a provincial basis might
work injustice on individuals, impede the flow of capital and
trade, impair productivity, and stultify countercyclical policy.
It argued that the provincial governments were unlikely to make
effective and equitable use of the income tax because a substantial
and growing part of income arises from the economic activities
of the entire nation.
Undoubtedly some better division of sources of revenue could
be devised than that actually prevailing at any one time in a
federation. And certainly a federal government should make an
effort to avoid use of sources of revenue the provincial (state)
governments can use, and are using, effectively. The most obvious
instance in which the federal government, in Canada as in the
United States, has not exercised this restraint is with respect
to the gasoline tax. But advocates of separation go beyond the
doctrine of forbearance. They seem to believe that sources of
revenue can (and should) be carved up and neatly allocated.
The difficulty of making a feasible division can be illustrated
by. examining the history of federalism in Canada and the United
States. Although the bias of constitution-makers in both nations
was in favor of separation, the practical result has usually been
overlapping. And this overlap has been extended with the passage
of time. At present the thoroughgoing separationist would have
difficulty in assigning taxation of liquor exclusively to one level
of government, or in parceling out the wide range of excises
levied for purposes of revenue and of regulation. Even more
insoluble is the problem of how to keep any scheme of separa-
tion up to date in a changing world. The practical difficulty of
makingasatisfactorydivision wasstatedvery neatly by
Mr. Abbott:
"Finally, neither the government of Canada, nor anyone else, so far
as I am aware has ever been able to discover any way in which the total
tax field could be divided between the dominion and provincial govern-
ments in such a way as to make it possible for the dominion government
on the one hand and all provincial governments on the other hand to
obtain from the sector of the field allotted to each the revenues required
to carry out their constitutional responsibilities. It would of course be
49possible to assign such a portion of the taxfieldexclusively to provincial
governments as to enable some provincial governments to meet their require-
ments but most methods of allocation would leave other provinces in a
weak... positionfinancially. This of course arises from the highly different
potential yields of different taxes in various provinces, and is one of the
major factors making it so difficult to get all provinces to agree on any
single course of action in the fiscal field. To approach the objective of
meeting the requirements of the less favoured provinces as well as of those
most favoured would mean assigning to provincial governments so large a
portion of the total field as to make it completely impossible for the
dominion to meet its responsibilities."73
The distribution of federal-provincial expenditures cannot
remain constant, and new methods of raising revenue must be
devised. If the fathers of confederation had crystallized in the
British North America Act their detailed opinions concerning
governmental finance, the task of providing social services would
have been put upon the localities, a progressive income tax and
death tax would have been prohibited, levy of excises such as
the gasoline tax could not have been imagined. A major charac-
teristic of federalism is that some inflexibility must be introduced
into the constitution in order to protect certain provincial (state)
and individual rights. But unless the area of inflexibility is mini-
niized, the successful existence of the federalism will be endan-
gered. Constitutional change should be infrequent. To multiply
rigidities is to multiply demands for change because of needs
that arise in a dynamic society. If such demands are frequently
blocked—as must happen—the usefulness of the federation wilt
be questioned by many groups.
In the minds of makers of federal constitutions the decisive
argument against separation has been that the hands of the
federal government should not be tied. Alexander Hamilton,
arguing in 1786 for concurrent power of taxation (particularly
with respect to excises), declared that the federal government,
because of its responsibility for defending the nation against the
plagues of external war and internal rebellion, must have a
flexible power of taxation.'T4 Beyond a doubt this vital difference
73Houseof Commons Debates, Daily Edition, July 9, 1947, pp. 5422-3.
SeeThe Federalist (edited by Henry Cabot Lodge, Putnam, 1888), p. 200. Separa-
tion of federal and state sources of revenue would, so the argument ran, be to
sacrifice "the great inheres/s of the Union to the of the individual States."
50between the responsibilities of the national and the provincial
(state) governments has tended over the decades to nullify the
theory of separation.
The tenacity with which the provincial governments pressed
their claims is, however, wholly understandable. If in every crisis
the area of federal taxes expanded, with no reversion afterwards
to the former position, the provinces would be left with few
assured sources of revenue. The semblance of fiscal independence
would be lost to them. Federal control of certain minor taxes was
not necessary in order to implement a program of high employ-
ment. The yield of these taxes to the Dominion was, moreover,
relatively small. The provincial governments argued, therefore,
that cession would be a small price to pay for agreement on the
larger program.
CONCLUSION
During World War lithe fiscal program of the federal govern-
ment expanded enormously compared with that of the provincial
and local governments. Federal tax collections in 1943 were five
times as great as in 1937, while provincial and local collections
remained nearly stationary (Table 6). The types of tax employed
by the federal government also underwent a remarkable change.
Whereas in 1938-39, 71.0 percent of federal revenue came from
indirect taxes, by 1944-45 the figure had shrunk to 34.4 percent.
Income taxation supplied 63.7 percent in the latter, and only
26.3 percent in the former year (Table 7).
TABLE 6
Tax Collections in Canada, 1937 and 1943
1937 1943 1937 1943 7937 1943
(millionsof dollars) (percentages) ($ per capita)
Federal 449 2,437 4-8 84- 41.00206.40
Provincial.... 159 173 21 6 17.50 14.70
Local 266 293 31 10 26.40 24.90
Total 874 2,903 100 100 84.90 246.00
Conference, Comparative Statislics of Pith/ic Finance.
These figures alone do not indicate the full impact of the
financial program of the federal government. By virtue of war-
time powers, it had been able to centralize and integrate fiscal
decisions, and the effectiveness of this program quickened the
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